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Some Observations on the Disposition of CCW Cases in
Detroit
Recent years have witnessed an alarming increase in the number
of crimes involving firearms committed in Detroit1 and other large
metropolitan areas. 2 In response to this increase and to studies indicating a significant relationship between firearm availability and
the rate of firearm-related felonies, 3 many commentators have made
proposals to augment or alter current gun control legislation."' Typical of the current legislation is the Michigan scheme, which requires
a license to purchase a firearm 5 and a license to carry a concealed
weapon. 6
Realizing that no gun control statute can deter the commission
of firearm-related felonies unless adequately enforced, the author of
this Note undertook a study of the enforcement in Detroit's recorder's court7 of the Michigan carrying concealed weapons (CCW) statute. 8 The CCW statute was passed by the Michigan legislature in
1. See, e.g., RECORDERS COURT OF THE CITY OF DETROIT, MICHIGAN, ANNUAL
REPORT (1960-1974) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT]; Edwards, Commentary: Murder
and Gun Control, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1335, 1341 (1972).
2. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMN. ON THE CAUSES & PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE,
CruMEs OF VIOLENCE apps. 5 & 6 (1969); NATIONAL COMMN. ON THE CAUSES &
PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, To EsTABLISH JUSTICE, To INSURE DOMESTIC ThANQUILin'
xiv, 184-85 (1967) [hereinafter To EsTABLISH JUSTICE].
3. See, e.g., To EsTABLISH JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 169-75; Zimring, Is Gun
Control Likely To Reduce Violent Killing?, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 721 (1968).
4. See, e.g., To EsTABLISH JUSTICE, supra note 2, at xviii-xix.
5. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 28.422 (Supp. 1975). An applicant for a license
must be at least 18 years of age, a citizen of the United States, a resident of the state
of Michigan for 6 months or more, a nonfelon, and legally sane.
6. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 28.426 (Supp. 1975). In addition to meeting the
requirements for a license to purchase, see note 5 supra, an applicant for a license to
carry a concealed weapon must demonstrate reasonable need.
Enforcement of the licensing provisions is regulated by MICH. CoMP, LAws ANN.
§ 750.227 (Supp. 1975) (carrying a concealed weapon declared a felony, see note 8
infra); MICH. COMP. LAws § 750.92 (1970) (attempt to commit crime punishable by
five-years imprisonment declared a felony); MICH. COMP, LAws §§ 750.228, .232a,
.237 (1970) (miscellaneous firearm misdemeanors). In addition, the City of Detroit
provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person to transport or to have in possession in
or upon any vehicle a firearm unless the same is unloaded in both barrel and
magazine and carried in the luggage compartment of the vehicle. It shall be unlawful
to carry a firearm on any public street or in any public place unless it is unloaded and
in a case." CODE OF THE CITY OF DETROIT§ 66-4-2 (1973).
7. The Detroit recorder's court has jurisdiction over all proceedings for crimes
committed within the city of Detroit. MICH. COMP. LAws § 726.11 (1970).
8. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.227 (Supp. 1975):
A person who shall carry a dagger, dirk, stiletto, or other dangerous weapon except hunting knives adapted and carried as such, concealed on or about his person, or whether concealed or otherwise in any vehicle operated or occupied by
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order to discourage the carrying of firearms in situations where they
might be used to commit serious crimes.9 This study was aimed at
determining whether the judges of the Detroit recorder's court deal
with CCW cases and offenders in a manner likely to accomplish that
statutory purpose.
The results of the study, set forth in this Note, reveal that the
members of the bench of the Detroit recorder's court view CCW as
a minor, relatively inoffensive crime. They devote comparatively
few of their limited judicial resources to CCW cases and deal with
offenders leniently. Thus, of those individuals initially charged with
CCW, a relatively low proportion are convicted of the offense or a
lesser offense;10 of those convicted, very few receive prison sentences even though the offense carries a five-year maximum sentence and many of the offenders have prior felony records. 11 When
considered in light of recent studies on deterrence, the results of this
study suggest that efforts at countering the increase in firearm-related felonies might beneficially be directed toward punishing violators of existing legislation with greater regularity.
Part I of this Note details the disposition of cases alleging violations of the Michigan CCW statute that were brought in the Detroit
recorder's court during 1973. Although the statute is only part of
the current scheme of gun control in Michigan, it is the principal
weapon available to the police and prosecutor in the preventive battle against the illegal use of firearms. 12 To give meaning to the dispositional statistics and to aid in perceiving the over-all judicial attitude toward CCW cases, the statistical results of the study are compared with statistics on the disposition of cases involving felonies
similar in nature or maximum sentence. Part II considers whether
the current enforcement scheme is adequate in light of accepted deterrence theories and concludes that a significant increase in the certainty and severity of punishment of offenders is necessary if the
CCW statute is to operate with any degree of effectiveness. Part
him, except in his dwelling house or place of business or on other land possessed
by him; and a person who shall carry a pistol concealed on or about his person,
or, whether concealed or otherwise, in a vehicle operated or occupied by him,
except in his dwelling house or place of business or on other land possessed by
him, without a license to carry the pistol as provided by law, or if licensed, carrying in a place or manner inconsistent with any restrictions upon such license,
shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for
not more than 5 years, or by fine of not more than $2,500.00.
9. See People v. Bailey, 10 Mich. App. 636, 639-40, 160 N.W.2d 380, 382 (1968).
10. See TABLE 3 infra.
11. See TABLES 5 & 6 infra.
12. Interview with Terrance Boyle, Managing Prosecutor for the Wayne County
Prosecutor, in Detroit, Aug. 1974 [hereinafter Boyle Interview]. More warrants are
issued for CCW offenses in recorder's court than for any other felony. See A.NNuAL
REPORT, supra note 1, at 9 (1973).
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ill suggests a sentencing scheme that is more likely to satisfy the
purpose of the CCW statute.
I.

ToE FINDINGS

The data for this study, gathered during the summer of 1974,13
were compiled by examining CCW cases initiated in Detroit in
1973.14 Because all CCW cases are begun by a prosecution request
for an arrest warrant, 15 it was possible to amass a complete list of
all CCW cases from the daily reports of the warrants division. Every
fourth case was selected until the sample size reached 475, 11 of
which were dropped because the files could not be located. 10 Information was gathered from the files, where available and relevant, 17 on all aspects of the criminal proceedings: initial appearance, probable-cause examination, plea negotiation, disposition
13. The author participated in the Wayne County Prosecutor's Summer Intern
Program. This study was conducted at the request of Prosecutor William Cahalen
and was funded through the intern program and by a special consultant grant.
14. Some CCW offenders are charged under CoDE OF THE CrrY OF DETROIT § 664-2 (1973 ), or under one of the miscellaneous firearm misdemeanor provisions, MICH,
COMP. LAws §§ 750.228 (safety inspection), .232a (purchasing without a license),
.237 (use of firearm under the influence of alcohol) (1970), rather than under the
felony statute, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.227 (Supp. 1975). The arresting
officer seems to make the decision regarding which provision to use, This study does
not include any misdemeanor or ordinance violation cases.
-15. The procedure that must be followed by Michigan courts in processing
criminal complaints is set out in MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 760.1-776.658 (1970),
as amended, (Supp. 1975). Most prosecutions for CCW in recorder's court begin
when the suspect is apprehended by the police and charged. The arresting officer
swears out an affidavit stating the facts that underlie the alleged offense. See MICH,
COMP. LAws § 767.1 (1970). The Warrants Division of the Wayne County
Prosecutor's Office determines whether or not to recommend the issuance of the
warrant. See MICH. COMP, LAws § 764.1 (1970). The defendant is brought before
the court for an initial appearance. Here the judge decides whether to sign the
warrant, and bail is set where applicable. Unlike the two-tier procedure practiced in
other jurisdictions in Michigan (district and circuit courts), in Detroit the entire case
is disposed of in recorder's court. See MICH. COMP. LAws § 726.11 (1970). Some
time later an examination is held where a recorder's court judge determines whether
there is probable cause to believe that the crime was committed and the defendant
committed it. See MICH. CoMP. LAws §§ 766.3, .13 (1970).
16. Files on criminal proceedings in recorder's court are maintained by both the
recorder's court clerk and the prosecutor's office. The recorder's court files are
usually complete, except for the defendant's criminal history and the prosecutor's
records of plea negotiation. If a case is at trial, being reviewed by a judge,
prosecutor, or probation official, or if the file is simply mislaid after dismissal by a
clerk, the file is not readily accessible; such cases were therefore excluded from this
study. It is doubtful that the absence of these cases could have significantly affected
the results of the study. A subsequent check of the missing files revealed many
different reasons for their absence-in fact, the only factor in common was their
absence.
17. Early disposition of a case will, of course, result in the elimination of later
stages. For instance, no sentencing information will be available if the case was
dismissed.

January 1976]

617

CCW Cases in Detroit

at trial, criminal history, and personal data. 18 The files generally
·provided accurate information on these items. Where gaps existed,
the case was removed from the study unless the missing data could
reasonably be supplied in light of the circumstances.19
The study is limited to cases where the defendant was charged
in the warrant and information with the felony of carrying a concealed weapon. There are situations, however, where either the officer in the street or the prosecutor in the warrants division decides
that criminal sanctions are inappropriate in the particular case and
thus fails to initiate a prosecution. In such cases the weapon is usually confiscated and the offender released. 20 These cases generally
are not reported and their incidence remains unknown. The cases
actually commenced are examined in this Note at each of the major
stages of the criminal proceeding, with particular attention given to
explaining why cases are dismissed at each stage. Although understanding why the CCW statute is being enforced at the present level
is unnecessary for determining whether that level is. adequate to deter potential offenders, it is essential in order to prevent any new
scheme of enforcement from being circumvented. The following
discussion critiques the disposition of the CCW cases as they flowed
through recorder's court.
.
In 9.3 per cent of all the CCW cases, the defendant was allowed
18.

TABLE: PERSONAL DATA ON 464 CCW DEFENDANTS
Age
Under 21
21-24
25-29
30-39
40-49
Over 50

Percentage

Number of cases

12.9
21.9
23.0
22.8
11.6
1.5

60
102
107
106
54
35

89.4
10.6

415
49

88.7
11.3

412
52

Sex
Male
Female
Race
Black
White

19. For example, if there was no record of a probable cause hearing, but the file
shows that an initial appearance and trial took place on different dates, it was
reasonable to assume that the defendant was bound over after a waiver of the
preliminary hearing.
20. Although the Detroit Police Department does not readily admit to 1his
practice, it is a well-known police procedure. Boyle Interview, supra note 12. CODE
OF nm CITY OF DETROIT§ 66-4-5 (1973) specifically provides: "It shall be the duty
of any police officer of the city to arrest any person found violating [CODE OF nm .
CITY OF DETROIT § 66-4-2 (1973) (set out in note 6 supra)] ••••" (Emphasis
added.)
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to plead guilty to a lesser offense at the initial appearance. 21 In all
of these cases, the prosecutor was either absent or objected. In over
half of these cases (56 per cent), the judge at the initial appearance
allowed the defendant charged with CCW to plead guilty to a misdemeanor. In dismissing CCW charges in this manner, judges assume control over the executive task of instituting and controlling
prosecutions without authority to do so and in direct violation of the
Michigan supreme court's decision in Genesee Prosecutor v. Genesee Circuit Judge (Genesee I). 22
In Genesee I, the court concluded that it was improper for a trial
judge to determine under which of two applicable statutes a prosecution should be instituted. In particular, the court held that a trial
judge abused his discretion by allowing a defendant charged with
possession of a stolen vehicle to plead guilty, over the prosecutor's
objection, to the crime of unlawfully driving away an automobile. 28
This holding was expanded in Genesee II, 24 where the court concluded that it was improper for a trial judge to allow a defendant
to plead guilty at trial to a lesser included offense over the prosecu:tor's objection. Taken together, Genesee I & II evidence a trend
by the Michigan supreme court to restrict the discretion of trial
judges to reduce charges that, while supported by sufficient evidence, seem unduly harsh. Genesee II was decided after the final
disposition of most of the cases in this study. Accordingly, the study
does not indicate whether that decision is being followed in CCW
cases by members of the Detroit recorder's court bench.
In addition to disregarding Genesee I, this behavior by judges
at initial appearances may be in violation of Michigan General Court
Rule 785.7(2), which requires that, if there is a plea agreement,
it must be acknowledged on the record by the defendant, his couns'el, and the prosecutor. 25 Indeed, the Michigan court rules explic21. Applications for bond were also handled at the initial appearance:
TABLE: REsULTS OF BOND .APPLICATIONS OF 464
CCW DEFENDANTS
Percentage
Number of Cases
Personal bond
69.6
323
Surety bond
$500 or less
12.0
56
Over $500
13.5
63
Cash bond
1.6
7
Case dismissed
3.3
15
22. 386 Mich. 672, 194 N.W.2d 693 (1972).
23. 386 Mich. at 683-84, 194 N.W.2d at 699.
24. Genesee Prosecutor v. Genesee Circuit Judge, 391 Mich. 115, 215 N.W.2d
145 (1974).
25. See People v. Leonard, 51 Mich. App. 368, 370-71, 214 N.W.2d 888, 889
(1974). Cf. Genesee Prosecutor v. Genesee Circuit Judge, 391 Mich. 115, 122, 215
N.W.2d 145, 148 (1974).
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itly state that plea agreements are void and subject to mandatory reversal unless acknowledged by the prosecutor.26
These initial-appearance statistics evidence an inclination on behalf of the Michigan judiciary to dispose of CCW cases in a summary
-and lenient fashion. This inclination, which as the statistics presented below make clear is apparent throughout the various stages
of the criminal process, perhaps stems from a pervasive view of
CCW as somehow a "different" or less offensive type of crime. Carrying a concealed weapon without a license cannot be placed into
either of the traditional criminal law categories-crime against the
person or crime against property-because the crime has no immediate, identifiable, victim. Rather, akin to many narcotics offenses,
it is a possessory crime enacted by the legislature out of fear of the
possible consequences of the activity. For this reason, it is quite
possible that judges inight personally view CCW as a less serious
crime than felonies having identifiable victims, 27 a view that may enter into their disposition of CCW cases. Judicial leniency may also
stem from a vague notion that an individual's right to bear arms
somehow affects the seriousness of the act of carrying a concealed
weapon without a license.
TABLE 1
RESULTS OF PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS OF
464 CCW DEFENDANTS

Examination held,
defendant bound over
Examination waived,
defendant bound over
Case dismissed
Insufficient evidence
Illegal search and seizure
Lack of jurisdiction
Failure of witness to appear
Capias
No record of examination

Percentage

Number of Cases

42.2

196

25.6

119

11.6
7.3
0.6
1.5
1.9
9.3

54
34
3
7
9
. 42

Twenty-one per cent of the CCW cases were dismissed at the
second stage of the criminal process, the preliminary examination:
11.6 per cent for insufficient evidence, 7.3 per cent for illegal
search and seizure, 28 1.5 per cent because the complaining witness .
26. MICH. GEN. Cr. R. 785.7(5).
27. See New York Commn. of Investigation, Report Concerning the Availability,
Illegal Possession, and Use of Handguns in New York State 40 (Oct. 17, 1974).
28. Dismissals for insufficient evidence and for illegal search and seizure can be
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failed to appear, and .6 per cent because the court lacked jurisdiction. By way of comparison, 16.75 per cent of all other felony cases
during the same period were dismissed at this stage. 20
A number of possible ·explanations exist for the higher dismissal
rate for CCW cases at preliminary examinations. Negligent or intentional misconduct on the part of the police during the initial investigation or search30 and judicial suspicion that the prosecution's
testimonial evidence of probable cause is perjured31 account for
most illegal search and seizure and insufficient evidence dismissals.
These reasons for dismissal are clearly valid. But the complicated
nature of the search and seizure questions that so commonly arise
in CCW cases affords the examining judge a great deal of discretion
in deciding whether to bind the case over for trial. It is not clear
that this discretion is being exercised in a manner consistent with
the manifest state goal of reducing the incidence of firearm-related
felonies.
A study conducted by the Wayne County Prosecutor in February
and March of 1974 comparing the reasons given for the dismissal
of CCW and narcotic cases indicates that the high dismissal rate for
CCW cases is not caused primarily by a higher incidence of truly
illegal searches and seizures. Both CCW and narcotics offenses are
by their nature possessory, and it is reasonable to assume that dismissal rates for illegal search and seizure should be about the same
for both. The statistics indicated, however, that this was not the
case. Nearly 85 per cent of the CCW dismissals were for illegal
analyzed together since there is no apparent difference in what is meant by the two
terms. See Boyle Interview, supra note 12. Either phrase is appropriate where the
evidence is excluded because the police officer either conducted an improper search or
lacked probable cause to search at all. The prosecutor's office treats these categories
alike and notes on each file, "The Assistant Prosecuting Attorney does not necessarily
agree with the ruling of the court: however, most cases are discretionary and not
appealable."
29. See AmrnAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 10 (1973).
30. Constitutional questions concerning the propriety of searches and seizures
arise during CCW prosecutions due to the possessory nature of the offense. The
CCW statute requires that the weapon be "concealed," but it need not be completely
hidden. It is sufficient if it is not readily observable by a person in the ordinary and
usual associations of life. Therefore, detection of an offender can occur only when
the weapon is observed by the officer or witness in the ordinary course of affairs or
discovered incident to a lawful search based on probable cause. In the complex area
of search and seizure, good faith errors on the part of the police are not uncommon.
See, e.g., Chevigny, Police Abuses in Connection with the Law of Search and Seizure,
5 CruM. L. BULL. 3 (1969); LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution:
Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 61 MICH. L. RBv. 40 (1968); LaFave, Search and
Seizure: The Course of True Law ••• Has Not ••• Run Smooth, 1966 U. ILL. L.F.
255.
31. Even in cases of legitimate police error, the officer may not want to admit his
mistake, and police testimony may be tailored to conform with well-established legal
standards. See, e.g., People v. Berrios, 28 N.Y.2d 361, 270 N.E.2d 709, 321 N.Y.S.2d
884 (1971).
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search and seizure, 32 as compared to only 57 per cent of the narcotics dismissals. 33 Moreover, a month-long study of "arbitrary dismissals," conducted by the Wayne County Prosecutor in November
1974, revealed that 10 of the 14 dismissals deemed arbitrary were
CCW cases. 34
These high dismissal-rate statistics suggest that the recorder's
court bench views CCW violations as insufficiently serious to warrant
the expenditure of valuable judicial time to unravel the complex
fourth amendment issues often raised. Yet it is the role of the
judges to decide the controversies brought before them. The dismissal of cases to avoid deciding complex issues can only be viewed
as an abusive abdication of that role.
Many of the CCW dismissals might be attributed to a "docket
clearing'' program conducted by ,the recorder's court bench in an effort to reduce case loads to more manageable levels. 35 Such dismissals frustrate the efforts of police and prosecutors, detract from
the deterrent effect of the criminal statutes, and evidence a ·clear
need for additional judges and courtrooms to handle the continually
increasing case loads. Perhaps more importantly, such dismissals
suggest that programs to increase ~e number of CCW offenders apprehended will not necessarily serve the ends of justice without a
concurrent increase in the number of judges or a shift in the attitude
of judges to viewing CCW as indeed a serious offense.
The stage of the criminal proceedings between the preliminary
examination and the trial is the plea negotiation stage.36
32. Ninety-eight cases were dismissed at the preliminary examination; of these, 88
were dismissed because of insufficient evidence or illegal search and seizure. See
TABLE 1 supra; note 28 supra.
33. Internal files of the Wayne County Prosecutor, Preliminary Examination
Department, Feb. and March 1974.
34. Internal files of the Wayne County Prosecutor, Preliminary Examination
Department, Nov. 1974.
35. Although the court's role at the preliminary hearing is simply to determine
whether sufficient probable cause exists to bind over the accused, see MICH. COMP.
LAws §§ 766.3, .13 (1970), both societal interests in judicial economy and fundamental fairness to defendants require that the court keep its dockets running smoothly.
See, e.g., ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUIL'IY 37-40 (1968); Enker, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, in U.S. TASK FORCE ON TIIE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE PREsIDENTS
COMMN. ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE
REPORT: THE COURTS app. A, at 112-14 (1967). In order to maintain the number of
felony trials at a level where these goals can be achieved, many cases must be
disposed of either by dismissal at examination or by plea negotiation before trial.
36. Statistics for this stage are more uncertain than for other stages. Plea
negotiation continues throughout the trial process, and records are often incomplete.
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TABLE 2
RESULTS OF PLEA NEGOTIATIONS FOR 357 CCW DEFENDANTS
WHOSE CASES HAD NOT BEEN DISMISSED AFTER
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION
Plea to lesser charge offered by
prosecutor
Attempted CCW (felony)
Misdemeanor
Failure to present for
safety inspection
Disorderly conduct
Possession of gun without
a license
No reduced plea offered
Case dismissed
No record of plea negotiation

Percentage

Number of Cases

59.3

212

2.0
0.5

7
2

0.5
8.7
0.8
28.0

2
31
3
100

As a general policy, the Wayne County Prosecutor allows those
bound over for trial on CCW charges (a felony with a 5-year maximum sentence) to plead guilty to attempted CCW (a felony with
a 2½-year maximum sentence). 37 In the cases studied, 59.3 per
cent of those bound over were offered attempted CCW by the prosecutor. Over three quarters of these (78.3 per cent, or 46.8 per cent
of those bound over) accepted the offer. In 8.7 per cent of the
cases, the prosecutor insisted on bringing the original charge. Generally, these were cases in which either the defendant insisted upon
vindicating himself completely or the prosecutor felt that the defendant, because of his circumstances, should be prosecuted to the fullest
extent of the law. In 3 per cent of the cases, the defendants were
offered misdemeanors, 38 and in 0.8 per cent of the cases, the charges
were dismissed at this stage.39 The remaining cases (28 per cent)
showed no record of the plea negotiation stage. 40
The general prosecutorial policy of offering a reduced charge in
exchange for a guilty plea stems from the inability of the prosecutor's
37. MICH. CoMP. LAws § 750.92 (1970), construed in [1939-1940] OP. MICH.
AITY.GEN.57.
38. Of those defendants offered a misdemeanor, 81 per cent pleaded guilty with
two thirds of those receiving probation and/or fine and one third receiving suspended
sentences. Over half of the guilty misdemeanor defendants had prior criminal
records, including one third who had prior felony records. Charged with a misdemeanor, the defendant faces only a one-year maximum sentence and avoids the
classification of "felon."
39. Dismissals at the plea negotiation stage are usually given as part of a larger
bargain or entered because the defendant has died, the court lacks jurisdiction, or the
"ends of justice have been met."
40. It is not clear why such a substantial number of cases show no record of plea
negotiation. In over half of the cases, earlier guilty pleas at the initial appearance or
preliminary examination or a capias may explain the absence of plea negotiation. In
the remaining cases, it is possible that a conference was held, but no record kept.
These cases are not lost to the remainder of the study and affect only this part of the
data.
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small staff to try more than a small fraction of the total cases. The
practice of offering attempted CCW to those charged with CCW is
particularly common because both crimes are felonies and because,
as discussed below, the recorder's court bench rarely imposes a
prison term on those convicted of either of the offenses. 41 Thus,
the prosecutor saves judicial resources without making substantial
concessions.
In light of current sentencing patterns, there is little reason to
criticize the prosecutorial policy of routinely ·allowing defendants
originally charged with CCW to plead guilty to attempted CCW.
Grounds for criticism would arise, however, if a higher sentence or
a mandatory minimum sentence were imposed in CCW cases and
prosecutorial plea bargaining significantly detracted from the deterrent effect of the CCW statute.
Slightly over one fourth of the cases in the study were dismissed
either before or during the plea negotiation stage. 42 Those that
were not dismissed, including those in which a guilty plea was offered, reached what may be called the trial stage. Of the defendants
reaching the trial stage, approximately 68 per cent pleaded or were
found guilty and 7.5 per cent were found not guilty. 43 Approximately 24 per cent of the cases reaching the trial stage were dismissed.
TABLE 3
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL FOR 348 CCW DEFENDANTS
BROUGHT TO TRIAL

Percentage

Number of Cases

2.9
53.8

187

5.2
4.6

18
16

Conviction

ccw

Attempted CCW
Misdemeanors
Failure to present for
safety inspection
Disorderly conduct
Possession of gun without
a license
Acquittal

Dismissal
No record available

10

0.3

1

7.5

26

23.8
2.0

83
7

41. See TABLE 5 infra. However, higher sentences seem to be given for CCW
than for attempted CCW. See text at note 52 infra.
42. This group includes those cases that were disposed of by plea at the initial
appearance.
43. Of the 275 defendants whose cases were not dismissed at trial, 230 (83.6 per
cent) pleaded guilty, 23 (8.3 per cent) had a bench trial, 8 (3.0 per cent) had a
jury trial, 6 (2.1 per cent) did not appear, and records were not available for 8 (3.0
percent).
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A total of only 2.9 per cent of all cases reaching the trial level
(10 cases of the beginning 464) resulted in a conviction on the original CCW charge. Convictions for attempted CCW were obtained
in 53.8 per cent of the cases (187 cases), while misdemeanor convictions accounted for 10.1 per cent of all trial dispositions (35
cases).
A variety of explanations were given for the dismissals at the trial
stage.
TABLE 4
REASONS FOR DISMISSALS OF 83 CCW CASES AT TRIAL
Percentage
Motion of prosecutor
illegal search and seizure
Insufficient evidence
Lack of jurisdiction
Failure of witness to appear
"Ends of justice met"
Death of defendant
Plea in another case
Sentenced on another charge
Other

3.6
36.0
19.2
1.2

4.8
8.4

7.2
7.2
6.0
6.0

Number of Cases
3

30
16
1
4
7
6

6
5
5

illegal search and seizure and insufficient evidence were the reasons
for over half of the dismissals. 44 As at earlier stages, this high dismissal rate at trial suggests that the judges are dismissing CCW cases
that raise complex issues in order to devote more of their time to
more serious criminal violations. And again, the result presumably
is that the deterrent effect of the CCW statute is thereby lessened.
Eleven of the cases reaching the trial stage were terminated out of
necessity, because the defendant died, the court lacked jurisdiction,
or the complaining witness failed to appear. 45
Eleven more cases were dismissed because the defendant agreed
to plead guilty to another criminal charge or because the defendant
was recently sentenced for an unrelated conviction. This last group
of dismissals makes good judicial sense. Because any sentence received for the CCW violation would be served concurrently with the
other sentence,46 it ,would generally be an unnecessary duplication
44. The appropriate time to raise such a claim is either at the preliminary
examination or in a motion to suppress made prior to trial. Trial strategy, including
unwillingness to disclose defense theories before trial and knowledge about different
judges' attitudes toward gun control, might well lead a defendant to wait until trial to
raise an illegal search claim.
45. Responsibility for the final group must rest with the police, since the
complaining witnesses in CCW cases are generally police officers.
46. See People v. Clark, 43 Mich. App. 476, 479, 204 N.W.2d 332, 334 (1972):
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of judicial expense to expend resources to obtain a conviction on the
CCWcharge.
Seven of the cases were dismissed because the "ends of justice
[were] met" without proceeding any further in the case. These
cases were dismissed because the trial judge, in his discretion, decided there no longer was any reason to prosecute the offender. A
wide variety of cases dismissed under this heading are so designated
for lack of any other appropriate explanation. Most, presumably,
are cases involving defendants not considered dangerous in which
the judge concludes that the threat of prosecution, coupled with forcing the defendant through the initial stages of the criminal process,
is sufficient punishment.
In 232 of the 464 cases, the defendant either pleaded or was
found guilty. 47 The over-all sentencing pattern48 for these cases was
as follows: 9.9 per cent jail or prison only; 2.1 per cent jail or prison
and probation; 6.0 per cent jail or prison, probation, and fine; 50.0
per cent probation and fine; 15.0 per cent probation only; 7.0 per
cent fine only; 9.1 per cent suspended sentence; and 0.9 per cent
capias (failed to appear for sentencing, bench warrant issued). In
short, a total of 18.0 per cent of those convicted were sentenced to
some form of confinement, while the remainder either received probation and/ or a fine, or a suspended sentence.

TABLE 5
SENTENCES GIVEN TO 232 GUILTY CCW DEFENDANTS
TYPE OF SENTENCE
Percentage
Jail or prison only

9.9

Jail or prison and probation
Jail or prison, probation,
and fine
Probation and fine
Probation only
Fine only
Suspended sentence
Capias

2.1
6.0
50.0
15.0

7.0
9.1
0.9

Number of Cases
23
5

14
116
35
16
21
2

"In Michigan all sentences run concurrently in the absence of a statute otherwise
providing. . . . Accordingly, after a defendant has pied guilty to one of several
multiple charges pending against him, prosecutors generally dismiss the other charges
after the defendant has been sentenced."
47. See TABLE 3 supra.
48. This pattern does not separate the cases according to the particular crime
involved for each defendant.
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SEVERITY OF SENTENCE

Number of Cases
Length of incarceration
Less than or equal to 90 days
90 days to 6 months
6 months to 1 year
More than 1 year

42 total
13
7
4
18

Length of probation
Less than or equal to 1 year
More than 1 year
No record available

170 total
77

Amount of fine
Less ,than or equal to $100
$100to $250
$250 to $500

146 total

92
1

46
50
50

Among felonies carrying a 5-year maximum sentence, the incidence of incarceration during the period studied was lowest for CCW
violations. 49 Convictions for receiving stolen property resulted in
prison or jail sentences in 33.9 per cent of the cases, while in cases
of larceny over $100, 34.5 per cent of the convicted defendants were
imprisoned. 50
Not only was the imposition of incarceration relatively infrequent, but, when the sentence was a jail or prison term, the prescribed period was usually quite short. Only 7 .2 per cent of all convicted defendants (18 total) were sentenced to a prison term exceeding 1 year, while 4. 7 per cent (11 total) received between 3
months and 1 year and 5.5 per cent (13 total), less than 90 days.«a
This sentencing pattern seems particularly lenient in light of the fact
that fewer than half of those convicted were first offenders, while
over 36 per cent had prior felony records.
49. See State of Michigan Dept. of Corrections, Criminal Statistics 4-7 (1973)
[hereinafter Criminal Statistics]. The statistics presented here are for the entire
state. There is no reason to suspect that there would be a significant difference
between the state statistics and those from Detroit. The incarceration rate for CCW
cases for the state was 19.7 per cent. Id. at 4. The rate in Detroit was 18.0 per cent.
See TABLE 4 supra.
50. Criminal Statistics, supra note 49, at 4.
51. The over-all sentencing pattern for the entire state indicates that those
convicted for CCW outside of Detroit received longer sentences. Only 33 per cent of
those sentenced to jail or prison in the whole state, including Detroit, received 1 year
orless. Id. at 11.
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TABLE 6
PRIOR CRIMINAL RECORDS OF 232 CONVICTED
CCW DEFENDANTS

First offender
Previous misdemeanor
Gun-related
Not gun-related
Previous felony
With dangerous weapon
Without dangerous weapon

ccw

Another felony pending
No record available

Percentage

Number of Cases

46.1

107

2.1
12.5

5
29

13.3
16.4
6.0
2.6
0.9

31
38
14
6
2

The leniency of the sentences imposed in the cases studied is
illustrated by the sentencing pattern for attempted CCW, which accounted for over 80 per cent of the convictions in the sample. Although attempted CCW is a felony carrying a maximum sentence
of 21/2 years, only 17.8 per cent of the guilty defendants received
a jail or prison term, and only 6 per cent received a term equal to
or exceeding 1 year. Over 73.6 per cent of the cases resulted in
probation and/ or a fine only, and 4 per cent of the defendants received a suspended sentence. Of the defendants who were sentenced to probation and/ or a fine, 46.5 per cent had prior criminal
records 52 and 28.5 per cent had been previously convicted of a felony.
Sentence leniency extended to those convicted of CCW misdemeanors (14.4 per cent of all convictions). None of the defendants convicted of a misdemeanor was incarcerated, while 29.4 per
cent of those convicted had prior criminal records.
There are no easily ascertainable explanations why penalties imposed for CCW violations are significantly milder than those imposed
for violations of felonies carrying the same maximum sentence. Obviously, the attitude of the particular judge plays an important role
in determining the sentence in each case. Judge Colombo of the
recorder's court bench, for example, contends that many of those arrested for CCW are honest citizens resorting to a necessary means
of self-defense and that harsh penalties are inappropriate, especially
where the violator is a first offender. 53
52. This figure includes those defendants with another felony charge pending at
the time of trial.
53. Interview with Judge Robert Colombo, Judge, Recorder's Court of the City of
Detroit, in Detroit, March 1974. The view that most first offenders should not
receive harsh penalties is widely accepted throughout the criminal court system. It is
felt that in most instances an individual deserves a second chance and that the high
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Doubtless there are many individuals charged with CCW whose
reasons for carrying a weapon are noncriminal in nature. M Sentencing based on the culpability of the offender, the criminality of the
conduct, and the offender's prospects for rehabilitation would result
in lenient treatment for such offenders and, in general, may explain
the high dismissal rate and over-all sentence leniency in CCW cases.
Yet, it must be remembered that the CCW statute was passed to deter conduct that could lead to criminal actions, rather than to punish
acts that are themselves inherently criminal. Because of this relatively unusual statutory purpose, general sentencing considerations
are less applicable in CCW cases. To comport with the predominantly deterrent function of the CCW statute, sentencing should be
conducted to maximize the deterrence of CCW violations, and
hence, the deterrence of firearm-related felonies.

II.

THE FINDINGS IN LIGHT OF

DETERRENCE THEORY

The dispositional statistics set forth in part I make clear that
CCW is being treated as a low-priority offense by those who admin-

ister the criminal justice system in Detroit. It is equally clear that
the present enforcement of the CCW statute has not decreased the
incidence of firearm-related felonies in Detroit. 65 Between 1972
and 1973, the homicide rate in the city of Detroit rose 11.8 per
cent56 while the national rate increased only 4.5 per cent. 67 The
incidence of aggravated assault increased 8.2 per cent in Wayne
County during the same period58 compared to a 6.2 per cent rise
nationally, 59 although the occurrence of armed robbery remained
virtually constant for both. 60
cost to the individual defendant as well as to society outweighs any benefit in terms
of incapacitation or rehabilitation. See generally S. KRANTZ, THE LAW OF TIIE CORRECTIONS AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS 24-29 (1973). In Michigan, as in many other
jurisdictions, provision is made for harsher sentences for repeat offenders. MICH,
COMP. LAWS§ 769.10 (1970). See note 111 infra.
54. The fact that so many of the individuals charged with CCW have prior
criminal records, see TABLE 6 supra, however, suggests that Judge Colombo's view of
CCW offenders as "honest citizens" is at. best true of only a minority of the offenders.
55. See Edwards, supra note 1, at 1341. One 1969 study reported that Michigan
had the fourth strictest gun control regulations in the nation. Geisel, Roll & Wettick,
The Effectiveness of State and Local Regulations of Handguns: A Statistical Analysis,
1969 DUKE L.J. 652-54.
56. Detroit Police Dept., Annual Report 45 ( 1973).
57. FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1 (1973) [hereinafter FBI CRIME REPORTS].
A firearm was the murder weapon in 67 per cent of these cases. Id. at 9.
58. MICHIGAN STATE POLICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 93 ( 1973) [hereinafter
MICHIGAN CRIME REPORTS].
59. FBI CRIME REPORTS, supra note 57, at 1.
60. Compare MICHIGAN CRIME REPORTS, supra note 58, at 93, with FBI CruMn
REPORTS, supra note 56, at 1. A study conducted by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration for 1973 indicated that Detroit had the highest violent crime rate

January 1976]

CCW Cases in Detroit

629

This section considers whether the plausible justifications for lax
enforcement of the CCW statute outweigh the societal costs inherent
in allowing individuals to carry concealed weapons with relative impunity. Upon concluding that they do not, a model of deterrence
is constructed and used to critique the current sentencing scheme.
In part ID, a new enforcement scheme is suggested that is more consistent with the teachings of deterrence theories and less susceptible
to subversion by those administering the criminal' justice system who
disagree with the societal assessment of the severity of the offense.
A.

Justifications for Leniency

The two principal reasons for treating the average CCW offender
leniently are that the offense is "victimless" and that individual interests in carrying weapons for self-defense mitigate the criminality of
the act. Neither rationale, however, can withstand examination.
"Victimless" concealed weapon offenses in the aggregate generate significant costs, including accidental injuries, homicides, and
other crimes involving firearms. Most homicides today are products
of emotional or drunken altercations rather than planned slayings. 61
A large majority are committed against a friend, relative, lover, or
spouse of the offender. 62 Many result from domestic quarrels. It
is arguable that, but for the availability of a firearm, many of these
intentional homicides would not have occurred. Indeed, "[t]he basic intent of the -[Michigan] legislature as indicated in the concealed
weapons statute was that weapons should not be carried where they
might be used to take lives." 63 Even clearer costs to society from
"victimless" concealed weapon offenses are the accidental injuries
and deaths that result from the presence of firearms. 64
of all major cities in the United States. N.Y. Times, April 15, 1974, at 1, col. 1
(late city ed.).
61. See Zimring, supra note 3, at 723. That article was based on data from 1967
Chicago police reports.
62. See id. at 722. Cf. FBI CRIME REPORTS, supra note 57, at 9-10.
63. People v. Bailey, 10 Mich. App. 636, 639-40, 160 N.W.2d 380, 382 (1968).
See People v. Clark, 21 Mich. App. 712, 176 N.W.2d 427 (1970); People v.
Cunningham, 20 Mich. App. 699, 174 N.W.2d 599 (1969).
64. Whether guns cause violence, contribute to it, or are merely coincidental
to it has long been debated. After extensive study we find that the availability
of guns contributes substantially to violence in American society. Firearms, particularly handguns, facilitate the commission and increase the danger of the most
violent crimes-assassination, murder, robbery and assault. The widespread
availability of guns can also increase the level of violence associated with civil
disorder. Firearms accidents, while they account for only a small percentage
of all accidents, cause thousands of deaths and injuries each year.
To EsTABLISH JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 169.
A 1972 report found that in 1966 there were 23,000 recorded firearm accidents in
the United States and that the rate of accidental firearm death by region paralleled
the geographic pattern of firearm ownership. See G. NEWTON & F. ZIMRING, STAFF
REPORT TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIO-
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Lax enforcement of the CCW statute presumably causes a general feeling of immunity from prosecution among present and prospective violators and decreases the likelihood that individuals will
be deterred from carrying weapons. Of course, the cost to society
from lax enforcement of the CCW statute probably is not significant
with regard to persons who commit premeditated crimes, since the
behavior contemplated by such persons is usually prohibited by a
statute that has a greater penalty and deterrent effect than does the
CCW statute. The only ameliorative impact of stricter enforcement
of the CCW statute against such individuals would be the preventive,
incapacitative effect of confiscating the weapon and temporarily removing the offender from the street. The cost of treating CCW as
a low priority offense may be much more dramatic, however, with
regard to individuals who do not carry weapons with any definite
criminal purpose in mind. Quite often the motivation of such persons is merely peer group approval. 65 When confronted with emotionally charged situations, they may use weapons to vent their emotions when they would not otherwise have done so had weapons not
been readily available.
It would seem, therefore, that there exists a significant danger
in allowing even· individuals without any premeditated criminal intent to carry firearms. Indeed, findings from a recent study support
the proposition that, but for the availability of firearms, the number
of homicides committed in emotionally charged situations would be
much lower. 66 As more persons carry weapons, a firearm culture
arises, which in tum encourages others to obtain weapons and increases, -presumably, the frequency of violent firearm crimes. In
short, CCW violations in the aggregate are far from costless, and laxity in the enforcement of the CCW statute augments those costs.
The contention that the severity of a CCW violation is mitigated
by the offender's interest in self-defense is no more forceful in justifying the current lax treatment of CCW cases than is the contention
that CCW cases are victimless. One obvious flaw in the contention
is the fact that guns purchased and carried for self-defense are frequently used offensively. Following the riots of 1967, the yearly issuance of gun permits in Detroit quadrupled, presumably because
people felt a greater need to defend themselves. Perhaps as a consequence of this buildup of handguns, between 1965 and 1968 homicides committed with firearms increased 400 per cent ( compared
to only a 30 per cent increase in homicides committed with other
LENCE IN AMERICA, FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN
[hereinafter FIREARMS & VIOLENCE].

LIFE 28-41 (1972)

65. See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCB213-17 (1973).
66. See Zimring, supra note 3, at 728-35. Zimring reported that "[t]he rate of
knife deaths per 100 reported knife attacks was less than 1/4 the rate of gun deaths
per 100 reported gun attacks." Id. at 728 (emphasis omitted).
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weapons), accidental deaths from firearms tripled, and firearm robberies increased in frequency twice as fast as unarmed robperies. 67
A second problem with the self-defense contention is that it is
based on, and in fact sanctions, an exaggerated view of the benefits
derived from carrying a weapon for self-defense. 68 The chance of
being murdered is slight. To put that chance in perspective, it is
approximately one fifth as great as the chance of, being killed in an
auto accident. 69 Moreover, most murders, as indicated above, are
committed during sudden quarrels with friends, relatives, or lovers.
In these cases, the victim presumably feels little need for self-protection and, if carrying a weapon, will often have set it aside. Even
in cases of premeditated attack or robbery, most attackers move with
such dispatch that the victim has insufficient time to respond. In
cases where the victim does have time to react, he will often have
time to escape or to use other, less deadly means of self-defense.
And, as a general rule, state laws require that these lesser means
be employed if possible. 70
In short, the self-defense justification for lax enforcement of the
CCW statute is unpersuasive since few situations arise in which an
individual both has time to use a handgun in self-defense and is legally justified in doing so. 71 As the National Commission on the
Causes and Prevention of Violence concluded in its chapter on firearms: "The evidence is convincing . . . that the armed segment
of our population is paying a heavy price in accidents and in the
shooting of family members, friends and acquaintances for whatever
deterrent effect their possession of self-defense firearms may be providing."72
B.

A Model.of Deterrence

The formulation of a sentencing scheme for CCW offenders that
is more consistent with the underlying purpose of the CCW statute
may begin with a survey of the acknowledged precepts of deterrence
theory. The analysis that follows is based upon the model proposed
by Zimring and Hawkins. 73 Deterrence, the foundation of virtually
67. To EsTABLISH JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 171.
68. See Edwards, supra note 1, at 1335.
69. Id.
70. See People v. Piper, 112 Mich. 644, 645-46, 71 N:W. 174, 175 (1897).
71. Deadly force may be used legally in self-defense only as a last resort in order
to repel an attacker who is realistically threatening to use deadly force. Se.e W.
LAFAVE &A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAw 392-93 (1972).
·
72. To EsTABLISH JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 175.
73. F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 65. It is a basic assumption of this
Note that deterrence is a viable means of crime prevention and that unlawfully
carrying a firearm can be deterred by proper enforcement of an adequate provision
prohibiting such behavior.
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all modem criminal justice systems, r 4 is a process whereby some
harm, loss, deprivation, or pain is threatened for noncompliance with
specific commands. 75 The degree to' which these threats are effective in inducing compliance with the commands is determined by the
response of the threatened audience of potential offenders. 76
Deterrence theory postulates that behavior can be controlled
only if the threats employed are adequate and credible. 77 A threat
is adequate if it is sufficiently stringent and credible if the threatened
punishment is applied sufficiently often that the potential violators
know that the punishment will be applied to them. The level of
threat that is sufficiently adequate and credible to deter varies
among offenses according to three factors: the degree to which the
average offender responds to threats and changes in the severity and
certainty of the threats; the value of the benefit that the offender
receives, or perceives that he receives, from offending; and the probability that an offender will be sanctioned for offending. To determine an appropriate sanction for CCW offenders, these three factors
need to be examined in detail.
1.

Offender Responsiveness to Threats

Whether the average offender for a particular type of offense responds to threats depends, in turn, upon the nature of the offense,
the context in which it occurs, and the characteristics of the average
offender. An offender is more likely to respond to threatened sanctions if the behavior he engages in is not a breach of the prevailing
moral code. 78 Individuals who act in disregard of existing moral
precepts are subjected to considerable opprobrium. The prospect
of public condemnation deters most individuals who consider committing an immoral offense so that only individuals who are anti-social or who act irrationally or impulsively actually commit the of14. Id. at 1; Morris, Impediments to Penal Reform, 33 U. CHI. L. RBV. 627, 631
(1966).
75. See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINs, supra note 65, at 91.
76. Id. At least one empirical study has applied deterrence theory and found that
crime rates varied inversely with the probability of apprehension and punishment by
imprisonment and inversely with the length of imprisonment. See Ehrlich, The
Deterrent Effect of Criminal Law Enforcement, 1 J. LEGAL STUDIES 259, 272
(1972).
77. See generally F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 65, at 160-72, 194-209.
78. See id. at 120-21. Cf. Andenaes, Deterrence and Specific Offenses, 38 U.
Cm:. L RBV. 537, 553 (1971). Zimring and Hawkins contrast homicide and illegal
parking to illustrate this point. With regard to homicide, they hypothesize that only
.5 per cent of those tempted to commit murder are deterred by legal threats while 99
per cent are restrained because of such factors as a personal abhorrence of killing and
commitments to religious and ethical value systems. F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS,
supra, at 133. With regard to parking violations, however, they state that only 5 per
cent of those tempted to violate are restrained by extra-legal considerations, while 80
per cent are deterred by the possibility that a fine will be imposed. Id.
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fense. Such individuals are generally least likely to respond to additional sanctions imposed by a legal system. In contrast, those individuals who contemplate committing an offense that is morally
neutral are apt to be constrained only by the prospect of a legal sanction. Changes in the severity and certainty of the sanction for a
morally neutral offense are therefore likely to have measurable effects in terms of the number of individuals who commit the offense.
In short, offenders committing offenses that are not considered immoral are more likely to respond to threatened sanctions than are
those who commit offenses that are considered immoral. 79
An offender is also more likely to respond to threatened sanctions if the offense he commits is one commonly committed in an
unemotional context. Decisions made quickly in response to sudden
impulses are less susceptible to the influence of legal and extra-legal
threats than are carefully planned acts. 80 Accordingly, offenders
who commit offenses that require some planning, or that are committed knowingly and in a rational state of mind, are more likely to
be influenced by threats of undesirable consequences.
A final and related factor affecting the responsiveness of an offender to legal sanctions is whether the offender is by nature a rational decisionmaker. In a detailed analysis, Zimring and Hawkins
have concluded that an offender is most easily deterred' (1) if he is
future-oriented rather than present-oriented, (2) if he is pessimistic
rather than optimistic, (3) if he is a risk avoider rather than a risk
preferrer, (4) if he is reflective rather than impulsive, and (5) if
he is normal rather than neurotic. 81 To this list might be added
whether or not the individual is strongly socialized. 82
When considered in light of these factors, the average CCW offender appears to be relatively responsive to the threat of sanctions
and changes in the severity and certainty of sanctions. Because carrying a concealed weapon does not, without more, cause injury to
other persons, it seems likely that CCW is not viewed by most people
as an immoral offense. Moreover, except in situations where a firearm is negligently left in clothing or in an automobile, it is reasonable
to assume that carrying the weapon is an intentional act of the of79. Zimring and Hawkins conclude that
where a threatened behavior is considered to be a serious breach of society's
moral code, the higher rate of compliant behavior on the part of the strongly
socialized citizen can be attributed mainly to his sense of right and wrong rather
than to his special sensitivity to the negative aspects of threatened consequences.
When a threatened behavior is considered a less drastic breach of the moral
code, his threat sensitivity may play a greater role.
F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 65, at 120-21.
80. See id. at 106-08.
81. See id. at98-111.
82. See id. at 119-21. Socialization is a nonlegal factor that is probably an
adequate deterrent for most citizens.
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fender based on" 'rational' considerations of gain or loss." 88 Application of the final factor to the average CCW offender is more difficult because, presumably, CCW offenders differ considerably in their
personality traits. It is likely, however, that at least some CCW offenders are relatively reflective, future-oriented, risk averse, and
nonneurotic.

2.

Average Perceived Benefit from Offending

Whether a threatened sanction is sufficiently adequate and credible to deter a certain type of conduct also turns on the average offender's perceived benefit from offending. 84 The validity of this
proposition is easily shown by comparing acts of theft and violations
of parking ordinances. The individual violating a parking ordinance
generally profits little from his violation. He may save the money
it would cost to rent a parking space, or the time it would take to
find a proper place to park. The individual committing a theft generally benefits or expects to benefit a great deal more from his criminal act. The prospective violator of a parking ordinance usually will
be deterred by the threat of a small fine. The same sanction, however, even if certain to be imposed, is unlikely to deter the potential
violator of a theft statute.
The perceived benefit that the average CCW offender receives
from offending varies in value in most cases somewhere between the
benefit received by the parking ordinance violator and the benefit
received by the thief. The offender who carries a concealed weapon
for no particular purpose other than to create a general sense of security would probably forgo offending in lieu of paying a $100 fine
or serving any time in jail or prison. The offender who carries a
weapon out of a clearly perceived need for self-defense may view
his benefit from offending as being considerably higher. While
comparisons are difficult, it is probably accurate to assume that the
average CCW offender benefits somewhat less from his offense than
does the thief, who receives tangible, monetary benefits, and the individual committing a crime of violence, who receives appreciable
psychological benefits. 85
83. Chambliss, Types of Deviance and the Effectiveness of Legal Sanctions, 1967
W1s. L. REV. 703, 706-07.

84. See generally Ehrlich, supra note 76, at 261-63.
85. The individual who carries a concealed weapon with a fixed criminal design in
mind probably benefits more from his entire criminal episode than does the CCW
offender without any definite criminal goal. For purposes of determining what type
of sanction is adequate to deter CCW offenders, however, it seems appropriate for
two reasons to consider the benefit received by the offender who carries a weapon
without design rather than the benefit received by the offender with a particular
criminal goal in mind. First, the primary purpose of the CCW statute is to deter the
carrying of weapons that might be used in emotionally charged situations rather than
to deter weapon-carrying by those individuals with definite designs to commit specific
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Probability of Sanction Imposition

To be an effective deterrent, a sanction must impose a detriment
on the offender at least as great as the benefit received by the offender from offending, for if the sanction is less, the offender can
offend, suffer the sanction, and still register a net gain. If a sanction
is imposed on every offender, it can be an effective deterrent if it
is just slightly greater than the benefit received by the average offender from offending.
If a sanction is not imposed on every offender, however, whether
because the offender is not apprehended, is not convicted, or receives lenient judicial treatment, the sanction must be considerably
greater than the average offender's benefit from offending to serve
as a deterrent. 86 In deciding whether to offend, a rational offender
discounts the threatened sanction by the probability that it will be
imposed. To use a simple example, assume an offender benefits
$5 from offending. A $10 sanction will deter hlm if it is certain to be
imposed. If the sanction is imposed on only one fifth of all offenders, however, the offender will view his expected sanction as being
only $2 and will not be deterred. Accordingly, for a sanction to be
an effective deterrent it must be greater than the average offender's
benefit from offending after being discounted by the probability of
its imposition.
Presumably, most CCW offenders are not apprehended because
CCW is a possessory crime that is extremely difficult to detect. 87
Thus, a sanction must be considerably larger than ,the average CCW
offender's benefit from offending if it is to deter with any degree
of effectiveness. The sanction must be larger still if, as is apparently
true at present, many CCW offenders have the charges against them
dismissed. If an appreciable proportion of apprehended offenders
are released without being legally sanctioned, potential offenders
will further discount the severity of the sanction in deciding whether
to offend because they will factor in the prospect of having charges
against them dropped.
Before proceeding, it seems .appropriate to summarize the deterrence concepts just discussed. The deterrence function of a particular statute is implemented only if the sanction imposed on those
who violate the statute is sufficiently adequate and credible to deter
potential offenders. Whether a threatened sanction is adequate and
credible turns on the responsiveness of the potential offender to
violent crimes. Deterrence of the latter type of activity is a task properly left to the
substantive statute proscribing the particular. crime in which the CCW offender
intends to engage. Second, the sanction for violation of the CCW statute would be
well above the adequacy level if it were set at the level at which those intending to
commit violent crimes would be deterred.
86. See generally Ehrlich, supra note 76, at 265-67.
87. See note 30 supra.
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threats, on the average offender's benefit or perceived benefit from
offending, and on the probability that an individual committing the
offense will be sanctioned. The responsiveness of CCW offenders to
threats appears to vary, but in general is probably high compared
to those who commit violent crimes. The average CCW offender's
perceived benefit from offending is significant (particularly for offenders with clearly felt needs to protect themselves), but in most
cases is probably much less than the benefit received by the individual who commits a crime of violence or theft. Finally, the chance
that a CCW offender will be apprehended is slight. And, currently,
slightly over half of those individuals apprehended for carrying a
concealed weapon without a license are released without having a
legal sanction imposed. Because of the ease with which police can
in most cases determine whether an apprehended individual has
committed the offense, most of the individuals released, presumably,
were offenders.
Before attempting to use these conclusions to construct a sentencing scheme, it seems beneficial to critique the assumption that
violations of the Michigan CCW statute should be punished, if at all,
only by fine, probation, or both. As the data in part I indicate, this
assumption currently prevails among those charged with the enforcement of the criminal justice system in Detroit.

C.

The Deterrent Impact of Fines and Probation

An individual convicted of a criminal offense is subjected to a
varying amount of public condemnation, depending on the type of
the offense, the severity of the sentence, and the social class of the
offender. This condemnation is part of the sanction for committing
an offense and must be taken into account in determining whether
a particular legal sanction is sufficient to deter potential offenders.
It is the sum of the legal and extra-legal sanctions that the potential
offender will consider in deciding whether to offend.
Because CCW is a morally neutral offense, the opprobrium associated with a conviction probably varies considerably as the severity
of the sentence varies. Thus, if an individual convicted of CCW
receives a suspended sentence or a small fine, his criminal act will
probably be viewed as a minor infraction, and he will accordingly
not be subjected to considerable condemnation. If the offender receives a more severe sentence, society may conclude that his criminal
behavior has been more significant and may consequently condemn
him to a greater extent. If an offender is imprisoned, the condemnation takes on a new dimension because of the severe stigma that
arises from the mere fact of imprisonment. 88
88. See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 65, at 177-78.
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Because it triggers little public condemnation, a fine is a relatively ineffective sanction for the commission of a morally neutral
offense. If an offense not inherently immoral is regularly punished
only by a fine, "both the offender and the authorities may come to
view the fine as the 'price'" of engaging in the unlawful behavior. 89
Thus, those who pay the price often feel no moral contriteness from
having committed the offense, and those who coUect the fine often
attach less moral significance to the offense than if other forms of
punishment had been used. 90 In a recent study conducted by the
Arizona State Legislature Criminal Code Revision Commission, a
cross-section of a community was polled .to ascertain what aspects
of the criminal law system posed the greatest threats to them. Out
of sixteen possible responses, the threat of a fine ranked fifteenth,
the threat of probation ranked eleventh, and the threat of incarceration, third. 91 In short, the commission of a morally neutral offense
that is punished solely by a fine engenders few extra-legal sanctions.
Consequently, the fine must be large in amount to deter potential
offenders effectively.
T-he relative ineffectiveness of a fine as a sanction is compounded by the fact that the deterrent effect of a fine varies according to the financial means of the potential offender. 92 A fine may
have little deterrent effect on indigents both because indigents often
fail to pay fines and because bench warrants generally are not issued
for failure to pay a fine. 93 A small fine may have its greatest effect
on individuals in low income categories. A larger fine may not deter
such individuals to a greater extent because they will be unable to
pay it. Only a substantial fine is apt to have much of a deterrent
effect on wealthy offenders.
In light of the characteristics of the CCW offense and CCW offenders, and in light of the problems with using a fine as a deterrent,
it is reasonably clear that a fine alone cannot adequately deter the
commission of CCW offenses. Because CCW is a relatively neutral
offense in moral terms, extra-legal sanctions can be virtually ignored
in determining the level at which the fine must be set in order to
deter effectively. 94 To deter, therefore, a fine must be set so that
when discounted by the probability of imposition it exceeds the aver89. Id. at 176.
90. Id.
91. Arizona State Legislature Criminal Code Revision Commn., Criminal Justice
System Research 230a (n.d.). This study began in 1974.
92. See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 65, at 178.
93. Boyle Interview, supra note 12.
94. There will of course be some potential offenders deterred by the extra-legal
sanctions flowing from a CCW conviction. But most potential offenders are probably
those who contemplate committing the offense and whose moral beliefs do not bar
them from doing so.
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age offender's benefit from offending. 95 While, as noted above, the
average CCW offender's perceived benefit from offending varies, it
is far from de minimis. For purposes of anlysis, that value can be
conservatively set at $100 per year. The chances of nonapprehension are very high because CCW is a possessory crime that is difficult
to detect. Accordingly, we can estimate that roughly 10 per cent
of those individuals who carry a concealed weapon without a license
at some time during the year are apprehended.
The above model of deterrence suggests, using these figures,
that the average CCW offender would be deterred from committing
CCW during the course of a year by the prospect of a $1000 fine. 90
This calculation assumes, however, that the average offender is completely rational in deciding whether to offend and that all offenders
apprehended are sanctioned. Because neither of these assumptions
is true, the $1000 figure must be raised even higher; in the absence
of concrete data, a figure of $2000 can be used. But there are further problems. To state that the average offender would be deterred by a $2000 fine means only -that half of the potential offenders
would be deterred by ·the fine and half would not. The half that
would not be deterred would probably include those potential offenders who are the best off financially, since many such potential
offenders would not accept $100 in lieu of offending, and since such
offenders are probably apprehended less frequently than average.
The most significant problem with a $2000 fine is that indigent
and low-income offenders will be unable to pay it and may therefore
not be deterred by it at all: A potential offender who can pay no
more than $200 will be deterred by the prospect of a $2000 fine
little more than by the prospect of a $200 fine. If that offender
benefits $100 from offending per year, he will be deterred by a fine
only if he faces a 50 per cent chance of being apprehended and sanctioned in a given year. If his chance of being sanctioned is only
10 per cent, however, it may be that no fine will deter him because
he will pay only $200 no matter what the amount of the fine. More
generally, it seems true that most potential CCW offenders who cannot pay a fine of $2000 will not be deterred by a fine of any size.
Many if not most CCW offenders are presumably in this category. 07
95. According to Zimring and Hawkins, three conditions must be met for a fine to
serve its purpose adequately: "First, the fine must be at least sufficient to outweigh
the value of the behavior . . . . Second, it must be sufficient to allow for the fact
that, in considering the present value of the prospect of future loss, a discount is
commonly implicit in the postponement of the consequences. Third, it must be
sufficient to offset the perceived chances of nonapprehension." F. ZIMRIN0 & G.
HAWKINS, supra note 65, at 176.
96. Actual fines imposed in the CCW cases studied ranged from less than $100 to
$500. See note 48 supra.
97. There are, however, no public records on the extent to which fines are
actually paid.
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In sum, a $2000 fine for violation of the CCW statute would probably deter fewer than half of the potential offenders. A larger fine
would add to the number deterred, but it would not effectively deter
the large number of CCW offenders who are indigents or in lowincome categories, who act irrationally, or who carry a weapon out
of a strongly perceived need for self-defense.
Probation is probably somewhat more effective than a fine in
terms of its deterrent impact, but it is still apt to be insufficient to
stem the rise in firearm-related felonies committed in emotionally
charged situations. The increased efficacy of probation stems first
from the fact that a more deleterious stigma attaches to those placed
on probation than to those simply fined and second from the fact
that probation affects indigent and low-income offenders to a greater
extent than does a fine. But the opprobrium engendered by the imposition of probation is still relatively slight when the offense committed is one, like CCW, accompanied by no real overtones of immorality. ,Moreover, the adverse impact of probation in terms of deprivation of liberty and invasion of privacy is minimal for cooperative
offenders. 98 Generally, the imposition of probation warns an offender that more serious sanctions will be imposed for further violations. For CCW offenders this warning is currently weakened by the
fact that those convicted of CCW who have prior criminal records
are not subjected to more serious legal sanctions.
Although generalizations in the area of deterrence are difficult
to make, it is probably true that the discounted threat of probation
operates as an effective deterrent only against those potential CCW
offenders who view a criminal conviction of any sort as imposing unacceptable social costs and who rationally act upon that view.
ill.

A PROPOSED SENTENCING SCHEME

The principal shortcoming of the current sentencing pattern of
CCW offenders is that it inadequately triggers the extra-legal sanctions that could be brought to bear upon CCW offenders. A second
shortcoming is that a low proportion of apprehended offenders are
legally sanctioned, which means in tum that a higher legal sanction
must be imposed on those actually sanctioned to deter potential offenders.
A sentencing scheme that would materially mitigate these shortcomings without punishing offenders unduly is a scheme requiring
the imposition of a five-day minimum jail sentence on all individuals
convicted of CCW or attempted CCW. 99 A five-day jail term, from
98. See generally S. KRANrz, supra note 53, at 46-54.
99. The Massachusetts CCW statute was amended in 1974 to provide for a oneyear mandatory minimum sentence. MASS. GEN. 1.Aws ANN. ch. 269, § lO(a) (Supp.
1974). The general impact of this change has not yet been ascertained, but one
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the offender's point of view, involves the "loss of freedom to act and
make choices, deprivation of the opportunity to make money, sexual
deprivation, invasion of privacy, rigid discipline, and living conditions
far below the ordinary standards of society."100 The threat of incarceration operates with equal effectiveness for both the rich and the
poor101 and should in general deter most potential CCW offenders.
The principal attribute of such a sentencing scheme is that it
would make better use of extra-legal sanctions than does the current
sentencing pattern. Incarceration, more than other forms of punishment, generally carries with it significant measures of social reproba1tion. As Zimring has remarked: "Imprisonment involves demotion to the socially depressed and disapproved status of prisoner or
convict, and the label is likely to remain longer than the sentence
of imprisonment." 102 Thus, the infamy flowing from imprisonment
is likely to be much greater than the infamy flowing from a fine or
probation; this phenomenon has the two-fold beneficial effect of increasing the extra-legal sanctions on the offender and sharpening
public awareness of the seriousness of the offense.
A mandatory jail sentence, if conscientiously applied by judges
to all CCW and attempted CCW offenders, would increase the number of offenders punished and thereby increase the deterrent effect
of the statute. Moreover, it would do so without increasing
the punishment imposed on those offenders who currently receive fairly stiff punishments. A further advantage of the fiveresult was a marked increase in firearm registration. The first day the statute was in
effect, over 700 firearms were registered in Boston alone. Boston Globe, April 1,
1975, at 1.
The Michigan legislature has recently enacted a statute, Enrolled House Bill No,
5073, 78th Legislature (1976), to add the following section to MICH. COMP, LAws ch.
750:
Sec. 227b. (1) A person who carries or has in his possession a firearm at
the time he commits or attempts to commit a felony, except the violation of section 227 or section 227a, is guilty of a felony, and shall be imprisoned for 2
years. Upon a second conviction under this section, the person shall be imprisoned for 5 years. Upon a third subsequent conviction under this section, the
person shall be imprisoned for 10 years.
(2) The term of imprisonment prescribed by this section shall be in addition to the sentence imposed for the conviction of the felony or the attempt to
commit the felony, and shall be served consecutively with and preceding any
term of imprisonment imposed for the conviction of the felony or attempt to
commit the felony.
(3) The term of imprisonment imposed under this section shall not be suspended. The person subject to the sentence mandated by this section shall not
be eligible for parole or probation during the mandatory term imposed pursuant
to subsection (1).
The act becomes effective on Jan. 1, 1977. Enrolled House Bill No. 5073, § 2. It
should be noted that the CCW felony, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.227 (Supp.
1975), is specifically excluded from the mandatory sentence imposed by this bill.
100. F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 65, at 183.
101. Id. at 185.
102. Id. at 190. See J. MARTIN, OFFENDERS AS EMPLOYEES 39 (1962); McSally,
Finding Jobs for Released Offenders, 24 FED, PROBATION 12, 13 (1960).
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day minimum sentence is that it would encourage police to arrest
offenders and encourage prosecutors to pursue cases they might otherwise have dismissed. Many CCW offenders do not need a heavy
sentence, yet do need to be punished in some noteworthy, exemplary
manner. If a policeman or prosecutor realizes that judges will deal
with such offenders by either sentencing them severely or dismissing
the charges against them, the policeman or prosecutor may decide
not to commence the case. If judges sentence such offenders to five
days in jail as a general practice, police and prosecutors who realize
the need to combat firearm-related felonies might be encouraged to
follow through on otherwise marginal cases.
Various commentators since the beginning of the nineteenth century have adopted the view that all crime would be eliminated if punishment could be made more certain.103 One commentator has argued that "[t]he effectiveness of a deterrent is derived less from
its severity than from its certainty."104 While these contentions are
difficult to prove or disprove, a number of recent empirical studies
do indicate that the certainty of some punishment is capable of exerting at least a mild impact on the crime.105 Ehrlich has found support for his thesis that "offenders, as a group, respond to opportunities (cost and gains) available to them in legitimate and criminal activities in much the same way that those engaged in strictly legitimate
activities do as a group." 106 He asserts that prison sentences deter
crime because they increase the cost of crime. 107 Mandatory minimum sentences increase that deterrent effect when employed in
lieu of other measures taken against the criminal that cost him less.
Sociologists ·have "found that fear at relatively low levels may produce increased attitude changes,108 whereas high levels of fear may
increase resistance to persuasion."109 The fear of a five-day imprisonment term should suffice to deter most prospective violators without causing a "forbidden fruit" effect.
103. See Radzinowicz, Preface to F. MCCLINTOCK & E. GIBSON, ROBBERY IN
LoNDON, at vii, x (1961), cited in F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 65, at 161.
104. W. Temple, Ethics of Penal Action 33 (1934), cited in F. ZIMRING & G.
HAWKINS, supra note 65, at 161.
105. See Antunes & Hunt, The Impact of Certainty and Severity of Punishment
on Levels of Crime in the American States: An Extended Analysis, 64 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMIN. 486, 489 (1973); Gray & Martin, Punishment and Deterrence: Another
Analysis of Gibbs' Data, 50 Soc. Ser. Q. 389, 394 (1969).
106. Ehrlich, supra note 76, at 274.
107. Id. at 262.
108. See Berkowitz & Cottingham, The Interest Value and Relevance of Fear
Arousing Communication, 60 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCH. 37, 42 (1960), cited in F.
ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 65, at 152.
109. F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 65, at 152, citing Janis & Terwilliger,

An Experimental Study of Psychological Resistances to Fear Arousing Communications 65 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCH. 403-10 (1967).
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First offenders would be most affected by the mandatory minimum sentence. The experience of five days in prison should be sufficiently unpleasant to raise severe doubts in the offender's mind
about further criminal activity. At the same time, the sentence
should be sufficiently brief that many of the negative aspects of incarceration would not have had an opportunity to criminalize the individual.110
The five-day jail sentence is, of course, only a minimum. Offenders with prior criminal records may require a more severe sanction, which judges remain free to impose up to the statutory maximums.111
The credibility of a sanction turns not only on the certainty with
which it is imposed but also on the effectiveness of the communication of the threat to the public. 112 It seems reasonable to assume
that some people may be unaware of the illegality of certain behavior, such as carrying a concealed weapon, that is not inherently
immoral. At a minimum, potential offenders must be aware that
the behavior is prohibited and that violations may be punished.
It therefore might prove useful for those who administer the
criminal justice system in Detroit to initiate a campaign to educate
the public about the costs and benefits associated with firearm ownership. Information could be furnished concerning gun registration,
requirements for obtaining a permit to carry a concealed weapon,
and hunting regulations. Yearly statistics could be provided pointing out the number of criminal homicides, accidents, and suicides
committed with firearms. Further, the various criminal statutes, including the CCW statute, could be set forth and discussed. It might
also be possible to construct reminders of the various prohibitions
and penalties along the streets in high-crime areas. A recent campaign in Michigan to post signs that read "Drunk drivers go to jail"118
is an example of this possibility. Use of local billboards, as well as
posting signs in government buildings, would help focus local attention on the firearm problem.114
110. See U.S. TASK FORCE ON CORRECTIONS, THE PRESIDENT'S COMMN. ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECI10NS
46-47 (1967).
111. Of those defendants convicted of CCW, 53.5 per cent had a prior record,
including 36.1 per cent with prior felonies. See TABLE 6 supra. MICH. COMP. LAws
§ 769.10 (1970) provides that a person convicted of a second felony may be
sentenced to a term up to one and one-half times longer than the normal penalty for
that felony. The decision whether to use this provision is within the sole discretion
of the prosecutor. See People v. Stratton, 13 Mich. App. 350, 356, 164 N.W.2d 555,
558 (1968). The Detroit prosecutor's office has made only limited use of the statute.
Boyle Interview, supra note 12. Increased use of this statute could be one way to
deter chronic CCW offenders.
112. See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINs, supra note 65, at 141-42.
113. See id. at 149.
114. Zimring and Hawkins conclude, "Extensive publicity and increased severity

January 1976]

CCW Cases in Detroit

643

The statistics in part I suggest that the low rate of sanctioning
of CCW offenders is partially attributable to the attitudes of the trial
judges. Mandatory minimum sentences would reduce the sentencing discretion of the recorder's court bench. Controls should also
be placed on the bench to prevent the dismissal of meritorious cases,
whether for docket clearing purposes or because the judge questions
the wisdom of the CCW statute. Oearly, .the judiciary must have
unfettered discretion in determining whether sufficient probable
cause exists to warrant a bind-over at the preliminary examination
stage. Further, it is the duty of the judge to determine whether the
defendant's constitutional rights have been violated. A requirement
that the judge state on the record his or her reasons for dismissing
the case (including, where appropriate, findings of fact and conclusions of law) might aid in eliminating clearly unreasonable dismissals. Plea bargaining abuses should be curtailed by requiring adherence to Genesee I & II and the Michigan court rules.
Only if CCW legislation is adequately enforced can headway be
made in halting the further development of a firearm culture in Detroit and other major cities. In the absence of effective enforcement, the number of firearms owned and carried is likely to increase,115 with a consequent increase in the incidence of firearmrelated crimes. Increased crime is apt to solidify nascent fears and
encourage persons to purchase weapons for self-defense, which may
in turn further increase the crime rate.
If a relatively strong sanction is imposed on violators with sufficient frequency, many ostensibly law abiding citizens will conclude
,that the costs of gun ownership outweigh the benefits and will give
up their guns. This first step must be taken if the rise in firearmrelated felonies, particularly those committed in emotionally charged
settings, is to be combatted with any degree of effectiveness.
of sanctions may conjointly achieve substantial marginal general deterrence." Id. at
157.
115. For instance, the number of firearms in the city of Detroit quadrupled

between 1965 and 1969. Edwards, supra note 1, at 1341.

